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Abstract 
 
This paper challenges premises regarding the ‘Kuhn vs Popper debate’ which is often 
introduced to students at a university level. Though I acknowledge the disagreements between 
Kuhn and Popper, I argue that their models of science are greatly similar.  
To begin, some preliminary context is given to point out conceptual and terminological 
barriers within this debate. The remainder of paper illuminates consistencies between the 
influential books ​The Logic of Scientific Discoveries​ (by Popper, abbreviated as ​Logic​) and ​The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions​ (by Kuhn, abbreviated as ​Structure​). The central purpose of 
this comparison is to synthesize a shared model of scientific change. The broader implication of 
this approach is appreciating common ground in discussions that are defined by their 
disagreements (particularly in philosophy of science).  
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 Models of Scientific Change 
Bridging the gap: Popper vs Kuhn Debate  
 
“When you turn to scientific inquiry, again, so little is known about how it proceeds - how 
discoveries are made - that we are reduced to speculation and review of historical examples.” 
~ Noam Chomsky, 2016 
 
Philosophy of science discourse tends to regard Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn as great 
opponents. There is some reason for this, as they have come to embody particular attitudes 
within the field. Popper was stringent about method and continuously advocated for skepticism. 
On the other hand, Kuhn was far less prescriptive, often defending the long periods of 
paradigmatic stagnation observed throughout scientific history. That being said, these attitudes 
tend to overshadow similarities between their models of scientific change.  
Despite their disagreements, I argue that Popper’s methodology in ​The Logic of Scientific 
Discovery ​is mostly compatible with the paradigm model introduced in ​Kuhn’s​ ​The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions​. In my interpretation, parallels between these books suggest fundamental 
agreements worth considering. Sharing common ground, ​Logic​ and​ Structure​ should exist as 
complementary perspectives for understanding the nature of science. 
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The Professor of Logic vs. The Professor of History 
Understanding the career objectives of Popper and Kuhn is key to interpreting their texts. 
Logic ​and ​Structure ​were clearly written for different reasons; so different in fact that their 
focuses and language create the illusion of great disagreement. In reality, as will be addressed 
later, many of these differences are due to perspective (rather than structural disagreements), 
coated with additional layers of subjectivity from the authors’ personalities.  
Karl Popper was primarily an academic philosopher who wrestled with “verbal 
problems” [1]. He spent much of his career as a professor of logic, which was his academic 
focus. As a witness to the revolutions of Sigmund Freud, Karl Marx, and Albert Einstein, Popper 
was determined to characterize theories. As a philosopher, his central contribution of 
‘falsificationism’ served to distinguish science from pseudoscience [2]. Consequently, his book 
Logic ​proposes methodology meant to provide science with a superior claim to fact. As the full 
title suggests, ​The​ ​Logic of Scientific Discovery​ is mostly concerned with logically evaluating 
‘discoveries’ that redefine fields of inquiry. The methods in ​Logic​ are in many ways ideals - how 
proper science should aspire to operate [3]. 
Thomas Kuhn, on the other hand, was a historian with a background as a physicist. The 
most progressive ideas in his book ​Structure​ result from observing large historical trends. His 
historical perspective provides a birds eye view that outlines distinct phases and sociocultural 
patterns. ​Structure​ captures how discovery has evolved under the ever changing definition of 
‘science’, as well as how it has not. Unlike the prescription in ​Logic​, ​Structure​ can be read as a 
more descriptive​ ​account of scientific development. The model in this book is explained in 
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relation to time, which is not the case with Popper’s logical postulations. This aspect of ​Structure 
may be partly responsible for scientific processes seeming longer and more resistant to change. 
Any comparison of these two intellectuals ought to be done within the aforementioned 
context. Most importantly, the methods of conceptualization in ​Logic​ and ​Structure ​are very 
different. As a consequence, a certain generosity is required for mending the gaps in translation 
[4]. With that in mind, Popper’s methodology can be fairly juxtaposed with Kuhn’s paradigm 
model. Looking beyond approach and diction, there are clear consistencies between these two 
books. 
Normal Science 
The most dividing concept between these two is undoubtedly Kuhn’s ‘normal science’. 
Normal science is research that adheres to a ‘paradigm’ [5] and consists of: a. extending the 
knowledge of paradigm facts, b. increasing a match between facts and model predictions, and c. 
further articulation of the paradigm. Many have argued that the existence of this research alone 
defies Popper's whole methodology. British philosopher John Watkins wrote that “the condition 
which Kuhn regards as the normal and proper condition of science is a condition which, if it 
actually obtained, Popper would regard as unscientific, a state of affairs in which critical science 
had contracted into defensive metaphysics” [6]. It should be noted that Popper himself did 
eventually acknowledge the existence of normal science, though rather disdainfully.  
Regardless, the large role Kuhn gives to normal science in ​Structure​ is seen to challenge 
Popper. Two main contentions for this are the following: 1. Unlike the falsification in Logic, 
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anomalies do not cause revolutions  & 2. Normal science is an example of science not 
characterized by falsificationism and skepticism. Although these are understandable concerns, 
they can be addressed.  
1. “Anomalies do not cause revolutions” 
In order to respond to this, it needs to be clarified that Kuhn’s normal science ‘anomaly’ 
and Popper’s ‘falsification’ are not synonymous. In fact, adequately distinguishing these two 
terms may do as much as to completely resolve this issue. In brief, anomalies are any 
unprecedented observations which contradict a theory (i.e. outlier data) , whereas falsifications 
are conclusive cases for replacing a theory [7]. This distinction becomes evident when by 
examining the entirety of these texts. 
 In ​Structure​, ‘anomalies’ are vaguely introduced as any “recognition that nature has 
somehow violated the paradigm induced expectations” [8]. This “recognition” is only the 
perceived​ recognition, since many Kuhnian anomalies are resolved or corrected within their 
paradigm. For example, anomalies in the orbit of Uranus did not lead to the abandonment of 
Newton’s principles or Kepler’s laws. Rightfully so, as suspended postulations later led to the 
discovery of a new planet, Neptune - explaining results perfectly under the current paradigm. 
Countless anomalies also turn out to be errors, and some are explained with minor adjustments to 
a theory. Sometimes, solutions may lie just beyond the available technology, in which case 
problems are rightfully shelved for further analysis. One way or another, the emergence of an 
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anomaly is often short of suggesting a serious dilemma on its own; hence it does not produce an 
immediate revolution.  
On the other hand, Popper’s ‘falsification’ is a much more deliberate process of testing 
and building upon anomalous evidence. The term was never meant to refer to a single 
observation, despite it’s singular conjugation. According to Popper, potentially falsifying 
evidence must be thoroughly replicated (among other requirements) before even being 
considered. In ​Logic​’s section entitled ‘Falsifiability and Falsification’, Popper writes that “a few 
stray basic statements contradicting a theory will hardly induce us to reject it as falsified. We 
shall take it only as falsified if we discover a ​reproducible​ effect” [my emphasis - 9]. This alone 
greatly distinguishes falsificationism from the ‘anomaly’, a term Kuhn used to refer to individual 
examples and minimally investigated results.  
This justification may seem insignificant however next to Kuhn’s stating that “even 
severe and prolonged anomalies” are​ ​not treated as “counter instances”. This is soon followed 
by, “No process… of scientific development at all resembles the methodological stereotype of 
falsification by direct comparison with nature” [10]. In these words, it could appear that Kuhn 
directly rejects the epistemological foundation of ​Logic​. Jumping to this conclusion however 
would be to overlook the intended point of this passage, which is to identify the factor which ​is 
responsible for theory replacement: a counter theory. Kuhn explains that comparing predictions 
to nature (falsification) ​is​ part of rejecting a theory, but that ultimately a “theory is only declared 
invalid if an alternative candidate is available to take its place” [11]. This is to say that what 
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Kuhn rejected was naive falsificationism [12], which (as shown below) is not the methodology in 
Logic. 
In addition to replication, Popperian falsification requires a corroborated [13] ‘falsifying 
hypothesis’. This hypothesis serves to replace or upgrade the theory being challenged. Popper 
writes, “we only accept the falsification if a low-level empirical hypothesis which describes such 
an effect is proposed and corroborated” [14]. This is vastly different from Kuhn’s anomalies, 
which can exist without a supporting thesis (or even an explanation). In many of ​Structure​’s 
examples, an anomaly is considered legitimate as long as it is accepted as data by the scientific 
community. Popper has also stated that “[a corroborated hypothesis] may not be allowed to drop 
out without ‘good reason’. A ‘good reason’ may be, for instance: replacement of the hypothesis 
by another which is better testable” [15]. This remark is almost exactly the same as that given by 
Kuhn. Here again, ​Logic​ recognizes that theories are not instantly discarded amidst controversy, 
essentially outlining the proceedings of ​Structure​. 
The process of corroborating ‘falsifying hypotheses’ also further bridges the gap between 
each book’s scientific revolution timeline [16]. Although bundled into one term, the time 
consuming parts of ‘falsification’ (i.e. replication and a corroborated falsifying hypothesis) 
essentially mirror stages in ​Structure​, such as ‘insecurity’ and ‘crisis’. In both examples, a 
theory's authority is first called into question by persisting anomalies, and eventually faces 
competition from strong contending theories. Kuhn lays out his stages more proportionally to 
their duration however, drawing attention to slower phases of development and bureaucracy.  
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The Anomaly, The Discovery, and The Falsification 
In ​Structure​, there is a chapter dedicated to “Anomaly and the Emergence of Scientific 
Discoveries”. Here​,​ the ‘anomaly’ is introduced side by side with the ‘discovery’ - a term usually 
ignored in the Kuhn vs. Popper debate (perhaps because it was not original to the texts). The 
neglect of the discovery is unfortunate, given that it’s more similar to the falsification than 
anomalies are. Like falsifications, discoveries in ​Structure ​“are not isolated events but extended 
episodes with a regularly recurrent structure” that blossom from anomalies [17]. Both 
falsifications and discoveries develop from anomalies, but, once again, are not ​solely ​anomalies. 
Incidentally, these discoveries (essentially described as the successful investigation of 
persistent anomalies) produce significant shifts in theory, or in Kuhn’s words, they “only close 
when the paradigm theory has been adjusted so that the anomalous has become expected” [18]. 
This seems to reaffirm that valid, replicable anomalies play a significant role. Once again, when 
accompanied with a ‘falsifying hypothesis’ of sorts, these discoveries also lead to more major 
revolutions. 
Logic​ also refers to discoveries as being a focal point in scientific change. Popper defines 
the term similarly, requiring a regularly recurring effect. He expresses that “Every experimental 
physicist knows those surprising and inexplicable apparent ‘effects’ which can perhaps even be 
reproduced in his laboratory for some time, but which finally disappear without a trace. Of 
course, no physicist would say in such a case that he has made a scientific discovery”[19]. 
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Popper insists here that effects must be “regularly reproduced by anyone” for them to carry any 
significance and therefore suggest a discovery - which would include a falsifying one.  
This emphasis on replicability proves that Popper reserved substantial caution and 
patience towards anomalous data, contrary to his reputation. Despite how instantaneous Popper’s 
systems may read in theory,​ Logic​ actually accounts for the time consuming realities of 
accepting novel information (including falsifications)- despite them being more thoroughly 
addressed in ​Structure.  
In sum, the ‘anomaly vs falsification’ confusion is a prime example of how these books 
emphasize different areas of a similar model. The haziness of these terms has additionally 
contributed to the misconception that ​Logic​ is unrealistic in retrospect.  
The basic models for scientific revolution in ​Logic​ and​ Structure​ can be illustrated side 
by side; boiled down into a unifying equation. This “equation” is highly simplified, but it lays 
out the major parallels between​ Structure​ and ​Logic ​proportionally (unlike the books 
themselves). It should also be noted that the following illustrations are not mathematical or 
formal logic. 
Comparing the Models of Popper and Kuhn 
The letters ​X​, ​Y​, and ​Z​  represent concepts that are essentially synonymous between 
Popper and Kuhn. As the product of the equation, the letter ​A​ will represent significant change to 
an overarching theory (i.e. the paradigm). The addition symbol “​+​” is placed between concrete 
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requirements for change, while the multiplication symbol “x” is used to signify processes being 
applied to those more concrete elements. 
 
  ​Popper’s Model 
(Outlier Results {X} + Falsifying Hypothesis {Y} ) x Replication/corroboration {Z} = Falsification*  
Falsification*  ​Change to Theory {A}→  
 (X + Y) x Z  A→  
 
 Kuhn’s Model 
(Anomalies {X} + Alternative Theory {Y} ) x Replication/persistence{Z} = Discovery* 
Discovery*  ​ Change to Theory {A} →  
(X + Y) x Z  A→  
* essentially a ‘Falsifying Discovery’   
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2. Normal Science lacks (a.) falsificationism as a function  
& (b.) skepticism as an attitude  
2a.​     Unlike more dogmatic theories of understanding (such as religion and political ideology), 
science has the ability to prove itself wrong, at least in principle. Incidentally, this is perhaps the 
core principle to Popper’s methodology. Considering this, normal science is inherently 
Popperian given potential to produce falsifying evidence. Normal science experiments correct 
their paradigm because there exist underlying expectations from which results can deviate. Of 
course to be aptly compared to the methodology in Logic, this would be under the assumption 
that most experiments are performed with accuracy and integrity.  
In the book​ Kuhn vs Popper, ​author Steve Fuller writes, “For Popperians, deduction is 
mainly a tool for compelling scientists to test the consequences of their general knowledge 
claims in particular cases by issuing predictions that can be contradicted by the findings of 
empirical research. This is falsifiability in a nutshell”[20]. Similarly, the deductive approach of 
normal science experiments (specific expectations from fundamental assumptions) lays the 
groundwork for falsification. Under this premise, normal science allows theories to progress in 
further detail while adhering to Popperian falsifiability. This was a goal of Popper’s, who 
endeavoured to ‘make the mesh [of theories, described as “nets”]... finer and finer” [21]. 
A sound objection here is that the ​purpose​ of normal science is still not falsification, but 
rather the verification of paradigm assumptions (which Popper rejected as a means of conducting 
science). After all, Kuhn writes that normal science works by “actualizing” the proposals of a 
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theory “by increasing the extent of the match between those facts and the paradigm’s predictions, 
and by further articulation of the paradigm itself” [22].  
Although this sounds like the process of verifying something, confirming evidence is 
more of an aesthetic byproduct of dealing with already corroborated theories: they are not 
supposed to serve a functional purpose or protect paradigms. Kuhn actually writes that the vast 
majority of normal scientists ​aim​ to complete “mop up work”. This is not the verification, but 
"the articulation" of the paradigm’s main theories through more specific hypotheses. Elsewhere, 
he confirms that the aim of normal science as a whole is “the steady extension of the scope and 
precision of scientific knowledge” [23]. In other words, normal science’s purpose is to further 
develop theories, not fact-check them.  
Turning to ​Logic​, a normal science under this definition does not affect theory assessment 
whatsoever. To preface, it should be established that Popper’s concept of an ‘axiomized system’ 
is essentially his equivalent to Kuhn’s ‘paradigm’; both being the accepted assumptions and 
statements based on unifying theories and principles. The fundamental postulates of the 
axiomized systems are called ‘axioms’ and all other hypotheses must extend from them. Popper 
writes that, “all the other statements belonging to the theoretical system can be derived from the 
axioms by purely logical or mathematical transformations” [24]. 
Founded in its axioms, Popper’s system mirrors Kuhn’s paradigm in its relationship with 
elaborative hypotheses (the inquiries of normal science). Popper states that a “system [of 
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theories] must be formulated sufficiently clearly and definitely to make every new assumption 
easily recognizable for what it is: a modification and therefore revision to the theory” [25].  
Rationally, the articulative hypotheses and expansive experiments of normal science (i.e. 
“mop up work”) can be interpreted as Popperian modifications and revisions. This is because the 
purpose of normal science is neither to falsify ​or​ verify its theories; it is to depthen them through 
further testing. After all, hypotheses only increase the detail of theory predictions and improve 
testability (and therefore falsifiability). To reiterate, developments of the sort are not involved in 
theory assessment and therefore have no responsibility to make falsification their purpose 
according to ​Logic​. Even so, normal science seems to provide an adequate platform for 
falsification to occur.  Either way, Popper’s methodological standards stay intact, leaving the big 
picture of falsifiability unscathed - at least within a reasonably skeptical and ethical scientific 
environment.  
2b​. ​Skepticism (ie. ‘critical attitude’) 
Skepticism is undoubtedly more challenging to identify, but nonetheless still observable 
in normal science. Much to the credit of Popper’s influence, critical attitude has become a 
cornerstone of the scientific approach. Although understandably reduced for the corroborated 
theories of a paradigm, this attitude plays an essential role in modern normal science: 
maintaining integrity. Corrective processes such as peer review and experiment replication are 
examples of critical attitude in action, their purpose being to preserve scientific standards.  
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A counterargument to this reasoning is that many structures designed to hold science 
responsible are corrupted and fail their purposes. In a presentation entitled ​Science vs. Politics: 
The Battle for Integrity​, speaker Heather Douglas remarked “What we do and do not know is 
deeply influenced by the distribution of effort among scientists, and this distribution can be 
distorted by power and money”[26]. More concerning yet, she gave examples of esteemed 
scientists who had successfully published manipulated data used to help verify certain agendas; 
all within the critical guidelines of normal science.  
Although these problems exist, corrupted research cannot serve as examples of 
unpopperian science - as they are not examples of true science to begin with. Douglas also 
acknowledges this distinction, clarifying that “deceptive research” which violates scientific 
integrity “just has the ​appearance​ of actual scientific research”[My emphasis-27]. The only time 
these practices are mislabeled as valid normal science is when they fail to be properly exposed. 
Regardless of their disguise, they are still intrinsically ‘pseudoscientific’. After all, ​Logic ​aims to 
define proper methods, so as to separate pseudoscientific claims from actual science. In the rare 
case of clearly unfounded claims passing scientific standards, the standards should be corrected.  
Kuhn is by all means justified in recognizing mistakes for the sake of history, considering 
their observable influence. Yet, because these are examples of ​improper​ scientific procedure (at 
least by modern standards), they should not contradict Popper’s methodology which serves to 
improve standards. All malpractice strays away from the qualities that ought to define science, 
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and therefore must be considered sub-scientific or incomplete. If the skepticism meant to uphold 
this ideal fails to exist entirely, then so does science itself. 
Skepticism is also closely tied to the previously mentioned phenomenon of normal 
science creating its own falsification. Although the aim of normal science is not to scrutinize its 
paradigm, skeptics arise by default under strict expectations. Kuhn admits that paradigmatic 
research is particularly effective for inducing change; counter evidence being “produced 
inadvertently by a game played under one set of rules, [its] assimilation requires the elaboration 
of another set” [28]. Examples of self manifesting skepticism in ​Structure​ include the discovery 
of oxygen. It is emphasized that long before helping to discover the revolutionary gas, scientists 
like Lavoisier were motivated by suspicions that something was wrong with current theories. The 
experiential outcomes that followed later gave form to what was previously only skeptical 
intuition from a select few. This form invited skeptics to turn up in greater numbers, building a 
competitive landscape between theories. 
Skepticism can be seen here as a gradual process, one that hesitates but that ultimately 
performs its Popperian function - discovering truth through falsificationism. Many normal 
scientists may lack a constant critical attitude on an individual level, but skepticism always exists 
where it is warranted. Otherwise, normal science would be the only state of science. To quote 
professor Darrell P. Rowbottom in an essay on ​Kuhn vs Popper​, “it is possible for science to 
perform a critical function with wide scope even when none of its participants have (completely) 
critical attitudes” [29]. 
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Further Reflections 
In sum, anomalies that repeat themselves and are supported by corroborated counter 
theories are essentially Popperian falsifications. This equivalence debunks the myth that ​Logic​’s 
falsificationism is too impractical and skeptical next to​ Structure​. Popper has in fact remarked 
that scientists becoming overly “objective and rational” will make “the revolutionary progress of 
science barred by an impenetrable obstacle” [30]. 
Kuhn’s attitude has also been exaggerated - yet in the opposite direction. In Kuhn’s case, 
normal scientists are interpreted as being unreasonably resistant to change. In reality, Kuhn’s 
paradigm model relies on a similar falsificationism to that in​ Logic.​ Put succinctly, Kuhn 
remarks that “insecurity [of a paradigm] is generated by the persistent failure of the puzzles of 
normal science to come out as they should. Failure of existing rules is the prelude to a search for 
new ones'' [31]. This understanding appears consistent throughout both books, although 
Structure​ does more to emphasize the hesitations around abandoning corroborated theories.  
It is worth considering as well that perhaps normal scientists aren’t protecting their 
paradigm due to a lack of skepticism, but as Popper speculates, because of a “skeptical attitude 
as to the reliability of the experimenter whose observations, which threaten our system… are 
insufficiently supported” [32]. If this is the case, ​Logic​ seems to once again account for the 
dynamics detailed in​ Structure.  
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Beyond these mentions, there are additional connections worth considering between these 
books. In the meantime, those included seem to reflect the most intelligible aspects of scientific 
nature- fundamentals which both Popperians and Kuhnians can agree on. 
Concluding Statement 
Understanding approach is crucial for comparing the ideas of intellectuals, especially 
Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper. The push and pull nature of their opinions provides a healthy 
range for science to evolve within, depending on the circumstances it finds itself in. Despite 
obvious differences in ​Logic ​and ​Structure​, the underlying models of scientific change have 
striking similarities. Hopefully by acknowledging these parallels​, ​future philosophers will have a 
more complete and unified picture of science. 
 
“There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective ‘knowing’; and the more affects we allow 
to speak about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more 
complete our ‘concept’ of this thing, our ‘objectivity’, be.”  
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